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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Technology is rapidly evolving.  Are our current laws still relevant or 
keeping up with this evolution?  This Comment will explore how technology 
has affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically as it relates to 
digital currency such as bitcoin.  As technology evolves, so do the methods 
criminals use to commit crimes.  In the last ten years, bitcoin has caught the 
attention of criminals who appreciate the supposed anonymity it provides.1   
Current case law allows government agents to search digital devices using 
warrants, which appear to lack particularity.2  In the last decade, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged how case law involving the Fourth 
Amendment may not be sufficient to handle searches in a digital age.3  While 
criminals are becoming more sophisticated, the Supreme Court has taken a 
significant step in protecting people against unreasonable searches and 
seizures related to electronic devices where bitcoins are stored.4   
There is nothing inherently wrong with using bitcoin.5  However, 
considering its prominence in the dark web, courts should exercise care 
when adding more stringent requirements to digital searches.  There are two 
competing interests: a person’s expectation of privacy and the government’s 
interest in obtaining evidence against criminals who use bitcoin to engage in 
crimes.  Considering recent Fourth Amendment case law changes, I argue 
how the third-party doctrine allows the government to investigate bitcoin 
crimes while enabling it to obtain the necessary information to meet the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements. 
Part II of this comment briefly provides information about what bitcoin 
is, how to get it, how to store it, and its prevalence in crimes.  Part III gives 
a general overview of the Fourth Amendment.  Part IV discusses how the 
Fourth Amendment applies to bitcoin and how obtaining a search warrant 
 
1. Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and 
Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2014) (providing reasons why criminals prefer digital currencies 
such as bitcoin). 
2. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (requiring a warrant to search the digital 
contents of a cell phone). 
3. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing 
concern the third-party doctrine is unsuitable in a digital age). 
4. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (declining to extend the third-
party doctrine to cell phone location records held by cell phone providers); Riley, 573 U.S. at 401 
(requiring a warrant to search a cell phone even when seized incident to arrest). 
5. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq 
[https://perma.cc/9JG4-6UJA] (listing legitimate advantages of using bitcoin over traditional 
currencies). 
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of bitcoin wallets may be problematic, considering how the Supreme Court 
recognizes and creates case law that affords digital devices greater privacy 
protections.  Considering this trend, Part IV analyzes how these changes 
may make it difficult for government agents to meet the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements for a search 
warrant.  Part IV explores the legality of a government agent’s ability to 
review Bitcoin’s public ledgers for potential criminal offenses and whether 
a warrant is needed to search certain bitcoin information made public in 
light of the third-party doctrine.  
Part V discusses how new case law limiting the third-party doctrine is 
inapplicable to certain Bitcoin searches and concludes with the need to 
maintain the third-party doctrine. 
II.    THE RISE OF DIGITAL CURRENCY 
A. What Is Bitcoin? 
Bitcoin is a form of digital currency used in exchange for goods and 
services.6  It is a digital payment system where people pay using digital 
money, similar to people shopping online using a credit card.7  Unlike most 
national currencies, no government or single administrator controls 
bitcoin.8  Bitcoin is also not available in a printed form like other national 
currencies such as the U.S. dollar.9  Bitcoins are entirely digital, represented 
by a unique sequence of numbers and letters, and created using free 
computer software.10  People analogize bitcoin mining to mining for 
gold.11  Bitcoins are created by miners who use computers to solve complex 
mathematical puzzles, which help create a bitcoin transaction record.12  
Their reward for solving the problems and adding to the record is a newly 
 
6. Id.  
7. See What Is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ 
information/what-is-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/85MK-GH76] (explaining bitcoin can be used to pay 
for goods or services electronically wherever bitcoin is accepted as a payment). 
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id.; John Bohannon, Why Criminals Can’t Hide Behind Bitcoin, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2016, 9:00 
AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/why-criminals-cant-hide-behind-bitcoin 
[https://perma.cc/XX6R-DSQZ]. 
11. How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ 
information/how-bitcoin-mining-works [https://perma.cc/5PQV-AEPK]; Frequently Asked Questions, 
supra note 5. 
12. How Bitcoin Mining Works, supra note 11. 
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issued bitcoin.13  Also, unlike how the Federal Reserve regulates the 
production of new dollars, the Bitcoin system is set up only to create a total 
of 21 million bitcoins.14   
B. How Bitcoin Began 
Bitcoin is the original type of cryptocurrency that uses cryptography to 
secure its system.15  An unknown person, going by the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto, developed Bitcoin in 2008.16  They described it as a “purely 
peer-to-peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments 
to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a 
financial institution.”17  The idea of cryptocurrency is that all Bitcoin users 
may control it using mathematical calculations, and it eliminates the need to 
go through intermediaries.18  Nakamoto believed the current method of 
processing electronic payments through financial institutions using what he 
describes as a “trust-based model” has inherent weaknesses, such as human 
error and fraud.19  Nakamoto’s most significant concerns with using 
intermediaries are that (1) they cannot effectively deal with fraud and 
(2) financial transactions are reversible, which is a disadvantage to 
merchants.20  He proposed Bitcoin as a solution to his concerns, a system 
based on cryptographic proof rather than trust, shifting trust from financial 
institutions and people to math and technology.21  Just as bitcoin miners 
mine to create bitcoins, miners earn bitcoins for solving mathematical 
 
13. Id.  
14. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5; Luke Fortney, Bitcoin Mining, Explained, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin-mining.asp [https://perma.cc/Q3 
ZK-W4PQ]. 
15. Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
c/cryptocurrency.asp [https://perma.cc/6AQ2-6F7E].  The meaning of the prefix crypto is 
“concealed or secret.”  Shobhit Seth, Explaining the Crypto in Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/explaining-crypto-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/HZR9-
53FH]. (defining the prefix crypto and explaining “[c]ryptography is the mathematical and 
computational practice of encoding and decoding data”).   
16. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7 (stating no one knows Nakamoto’s true identity). 
17. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 1 (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N2L-R99T]. 
18. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.  
19. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 1.  
20. See id. (commenting on how merchants have to be cautious of customers and fear the risk 
of having their transactions reversed due to fraud). 
21. Id.  
4
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 1, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/5
  
2020] COMMENT 157 
equations that verify the bitcoin used in the transaction is not duplicated, 
which prevents buyers from double-spending.22  
C. Storing and Acquiring Bitcoin 
Before owning a bitcoin, users have to decide where they will save 
them.23  This storage is known as a “wallet.”24  Users have various storage 
options available: they may use their computer, cell phone, hardware such 
as a portable hard drive, or paper.25  The advantages of installing a software 
wallet on a computer are that it is usually free, easy to set up, and allows 
users to have control over their keys.26  Unfortunately, users must be careful 
because hackers may have access to users’ wallets and bitcoins if hackers 
gain access to their computers.27  Users may also use cloud wallets, which 
allows users access to their bitcoins from any device.28  While cloud wallets 
are convenient, this storage method also offers lower security because users 
are entrusting a third party to secure their money.29  Mobile wallets allow 
users to access their bitcoins from their mobile devices.30  Some users prefer 
using hardware wallets to store their bitcoins because they are usually offline, 
making them more secure and difficult to hack.31  The disadvantage of using 
a hardware wallet or storing your bitcoin on a portable hard drive is that, if 
the device is lost or stolen, you may lose those bitcoins too.32  Another 
option for bitcoin users is to write down their bitcoin keys on paper.33  
While paper is not hackable, it is easier to lose or destroy.34 
After users create a digital wallet, they may begin acquiring bitcoins.  
People can acquire bitcoins by accepting them “[a]s payment for goods and 
services,” purchasing bitcoins from a specialized exchange such as Bitfinex, 
 
22. Although mathematics is used to solve problems, most of mining is a guessing game.  Miners 
use computers to solve the problems and many miners work together, combining computing power to 
solve the equations faster.  Fortney, supra note 14. 
23. How to Store Your Bitcoin, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/ 
information/how-to-store-your-bitcoins [https://perma.cc/ZUE7-ZC7F]. 
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. Id.  
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. Id. 
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Coinbase, Bitstamp, or Poloniez, exchanging bitcoins with other bitcoin 
users, or bitcoin mining.35  After acquiring bitcoin, users are issued a public 
and private key that may be stored in the digital wallet.36  Users share their 
public key—similar to an email address—with other users to transfer 
bitcoins.37  Users use their private key—similar to a debit card PIN—to 
authorize transactions.38  
Unlike cash transactions, Bitcoin records every transaction on a public 
ledger known as a blockchain.39  Everyone has access to the blockchain.40  
Users can use the blockchain to verify the authenticity of a bitcoin payment 
and ensure the payment is coming from the bitcoin’s rightful owner.41   
There are several advantages of using bitcoin instead of traditional 
currencies, the first being that it allows for payment freedom.42  People do 
not have to worry about bank holidays, borders, or bureaucracy,43 allowing 
users can exchange bitcoins at any time from any place in the world.44  
Merchants benefit from accepting bitcoins because the transactions are 
irreversible,45 and Bitcoin provides merchants better protection against 
fraud.46  Buyers benefit from using bitcoin because there is stronger 
protection against identity theft, and buyers do not have to worry about 
erroneous merchant charges.47  Another advantage is that all bitcoin 
transactions are available on a public ledger for users to verify 
transactions.48  Also, bitcoin transactions and accounts are not linked to 
real-world identities unless the user provides personal information.49  While 
 
35. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5; How Can I Buy Bitcoin?, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-can-i-buy-bitcoins [https://perma.cc/PVT2-GCJX]. 
36. How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/ 
how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/3WYG-DMCF]. 
37. Prableen Bajpai, How to Buy Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/tech/ 
how-to-buy-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/ZB4J-KELK]. 
38. Id.  
39. How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works [https://perma. 
cc/76XC-Q6ND]. 
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.  
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. How Does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 39.  
49. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5. 
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most people use bitcoin for legal purposes, criminals take advantage of 
bitcoin’s anonymity to engage in illegal activities.50 
D. Criminal Activity Involving Bitcoin 
There is nothing inherently wrong with using bitcoin to transact with 
others.  Bitcoin provides legitimate benefits to individuals, businesses, and 
organizations because it minimizes the risk of fraud by preventing double-
spending or duplicating money.51  This benefit attracts criminals because it 
reduces the risk of getting scammed.52  Another advantage is business 
transactions may occur without tying a person’s personal information, 
which helps prevent identity theft.53  Because of this, there is a perception 
bitcoin allows for anonymity, which further attracts criminals.54  There are 
thousands of cryptocurrencies, but bitcoin is the original and most common 
form of cryptocurrency used in crimes involving cryptocurrency.55  
Criminals use bitcoin for trafficking illegal goods, soliciting child 
pornography, tax evasion, money laundering, funding terrorism, “and even 
murder for hire.”56 
One of the best examples of using bitcoin for illegal purposes is the story 
of a black-market website known as Silk Road.57  Silk Road started as a 
marketplace for people to buy and sell drugs.58  As such, people commonly 
referred to Silk Road as the “[a]mazon.com” for drugs.59  Buyers and sellers 
used bitcoin exclusively because of its perceived anonymity.60  Using bitcoin  
and other encryption tools allowed users to engage in illegal activity without 
 
50. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7.  
51. Nikita Malik, How Criminals and Terrorists Use Cryptocurrency: And How To Stop It, FORBES 
(Aug. 31, 2018, 10:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nikitamalik/2018/08/31/how-criminals-
and-terrorists-use-cryptocurrency-and-how-to-stop-it/#2cf57f763990 [https://perma.cc/T29F-7A 
VB]. 
52. Id.  
53. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.  
54. Malik, supra note 51.  
55. Jen Wieczner, Bitcoin Accounts for 95% of Cryptocurrency Crimes, Says Analyst, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/04/24/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-crime [https://perma.cc/ 
E9AR-GLXX]. 
56. Stephen Small, Comment, Bitcoin: The Napster of Currency, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 581, 583 
(2015) (describing how bitcoin is used for illegal purposes). 
57. See Larry McIntyre, Comment, Cyber-Takings: The War on Crime Moves into the Cloud, 14 PITT. 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 333, 342–43 (2014) (discussing the origins of Silk Road). 
58. Id. at 342–43.  
59. Id. at 342. 
60. Id. at 343. 
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the fear of getting caught.61  It took two years for the government to find 
the website owner, and that was only because the owner inadvertently 
exposed his identity.62  In the last few years, more cases involving Bitcoin 
have emerged, and in almost every case, the defendant argued the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment.63 
III.    FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW 
The United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.64   
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee absolute 
protection against all searches—only unreasonable ones.65  Historically, the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection was limited to physical intrusions into 
constitutionally protected areas such as homes.66  Early interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment required a “trespass” analysis.67  Since Katz v. United 
States,68 cases involving the Fourth Amendment have adopted 
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.69  Katz 
introduced the notion the Fourth Amendment protects people and not 
places,70 and this analysis predominated for decades.71  Nevertheless, the 
trespass analysis is still alive.72  In recent years, the Court has, on occasion, 
 
61. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7. 
62. McIntyre, supra note 57, at 343.  
63. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 98 (2d Cir. 2017) (arguing the government 
violated the defendant’s privacy interest by monitoring his IP address traffic). 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
65. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“For ‘what the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960))). 
66. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (concluding the Fourth Amendment 
was not violated when the government tapped a person’s telephone conversations because there was 
no physical trespass onto his property), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
67. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66 (exemplifying a trespass analysis). 
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
69. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012). 
70. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
71. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406. 
72. Id. at 406–07. 
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relied on a trespass analysis.73  Thus, the government can implicate a 
person’s Fourth Amendment right in two ways: (1) a search by a 
governmental agent of an area where a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy; or (2) a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area 
such as a home.74 
To determine whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment, courts use a subjective and objective test.75  
The defendant must establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in 
the place searched, and the subjective expectation must be one society 
would accept as reasonable.76  If the person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, a police officer needs a warrant to search the area unless the search 
satisfies one of the warrant requirement exceptions.77  A neutral and 
detached magistrate judge issues the warrant after the officer has proven 
probable cause.78  If there is no trespass or reasonable expectation of 
privacy, then a search warrant is not needed.   
Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect information a person 
shares with third parties.79  A person does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy for information he shares with others.80  The general rule is if 
someone provides information to a third party, that person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and a government agent may obtain that 
information from third parties without a warrant.81  This belief is true even 
if someone believed the information shared with a third party would remain 
private.82  In Hoffa v. United States,83 the Supreme Court held the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect information shared with others 
because of a person’s “misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
 
73. Id. at 404–05. 
74. See id. at 406–07 (holding the Fourth Amendment protects against government trespass);  
see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (explaining the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn solely on the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosed structure).  
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 361–62.  
78. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109–10 (1965). 
79. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,  
442–44 (1976). 
80. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (explaining there is not a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the sound of one’s voice). 
81. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445–46 (concluding Defendant did not have a Fourth Amendment 
interest to dispute the subpoena of his bank records). 
82. Id. at 443. 
83. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
9
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confides” will not share that information with someone else.84  This idea is 
one of the concepts behind the third-party doctrine.85 
The consequence of not having the third-party doctrine is that if a 
government agent successfully obtained evidence against a defendant 
through an unlawful search, such evidence might be subject to the 
exclusionary rule.  The exclusionary rule prevents the government from 
presenting evidence obtained through an unlawful search.86  Its purpose is 
to deter government agents from violating a person’s Fourth Amendment 
right by conducting an unlawful search.87  Stricter laws may hinder the 
government’s ability to find criminals or obtain evidence.  If a court deems 
the government’s search unlawful, it is possible the government is prevented 
from presenting such crucial evidence.88   
IV.    APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO BITCOIN 
Bitcoin searches can occur in at least three different ways.89  A 
government agent can search a person’s digital wallet,90 the Bitcoin public 
ledger,91 or subpoena records from third-party exchanges who assist in the 
buying, selling, and managing of cryptocurrency.  The Fourth Amendment 
is implicated differently in each scenario. 
 
84. Id. at 302. 
85. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (“The third-party doctrine partly 
stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly 
shared with another.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 440 (stating a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not 
implicated unless the government has intruded into one’s “zone of privacy” and information shared 
with third parties is not private). 
86. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating the exclusionary rule is “an essential 
part of the right to privacy” the Fourth Amendment is trying to protect); Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) (explaining those who execute the criminal laws to obtain conviction by 
means of unlawful search and seizures “should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts”). 
87. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule’s prime 
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
88. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 2017). 
89. Will Yakowicz, Startups Helping the FBI Catch Bitcoin Criminals, INC. (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/startups-law-enforcement-agencies-catch-criminals-who-use-cr 
yptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/3RBF-YJEC]. 
90. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100–01 (explaining how a search warrant may be used to search a hard 
drive for bitcoin wallet files). 
91. See Yakowicz, supra note 89 (discussing how startup companies are helping law enforcement 
by creating forensic software which identifies patterns in detecting crimes and tracing the transactions 
to the end user). 
10
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A. Searching Bitcoin Wallets and the Limitations of Cell Phones 
Bitcoin raises several Fourth Amendment search issues because of how 
people obtain and store the cryptocurrency.92  Federal courts have issued 
opinions that demonstrate a trend toward affording more protection to the 
information contained in electronic devices.93  As technology evolves, 
courts are slowly beginning to adapt to that change.  The nature of modern 
technology, which holds so much data and personal information, has caused 
the courts to think more broadly about what a protected interest is and more 
narrowly about the third-party doctrine exception.94 
For example, the Court—applying Katz—has long permitted officers to 
search persons incident to a lawful arrest so that they may protect 
themselves or preserve evidence of the crime.95  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court recognized the need to adapt to the advancement of technology, 
especially as it relates to storage, surveillance, and communication.96  In 
Chimel v. California,97 the Supreme Court held when an officer arrests a 
person, the officer may search the person incident to a lawful arrest without 
a warrant to protect themselves or preserve evidence of a crime.98  Forty-
 
92. See Jonathan Lane, Note, Bitcoin, Silk Road, and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency 
Regulation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 540 (2014) (“As applied to Bitcoin, perhaps the most important 
Fourth Amendment issue is law enforcement’s ability to search and/or seize the digital currency and 
the personal computers and devices used for its storage and transfer.”). 
93. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (acknowledging how gaining 
access to a person’s cell phone location allows the government to take a peek into the intimate details 
of a person’s life); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding a warrant is needed to search 
data information on a cell phone seized from an arrestee due to the privacy concerns implicated 
because of the  immense amount of information contained inside them); United States v. Blood, 429 F. 
App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A laptop computer is entitled to the same Fourth Amendment 
protection as other closed containers and personal effects.”); Lane, supra note 92 (finding a “trend in 
federal court rulings suggest[ing]” electronic devices are afforded the same Fourth Amendment 
protection as containers).  
94. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (“This sort of digital data—personal [cellphone-cite] location 
information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”). 
95. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for 
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent 
its concealment or destruction.”). 
96. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (recognizing the importance of preserving a person’s Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy against the government as technology evolves); Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens 
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).  
97. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
98. Id. at 762–63. 
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five years later, the Supreme Court limited the holding by requiring 
government agents to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone.99   
In Riley v. California,100 the Court ruled that officers may only examine a 
cell phone’s physical characteristics with a search warrant, but not the 
information contained inside it.101  The Court reasoned that such a search 
implicates significant privacy concerns.102  While cell phones are like any 
container that might contain evidence of a crime, they pose a special danger 
compared to other containers, such as a cigarette pack, where you may find 
evidence of a crime, or a bag, which may contain a weapon.103  The term 
“cell phone” is misleading because cell phones are more than just containers 
or devices used to text and talk.104  Cell phones are essentially 
minicomputers, which “could easily be called cameras, video players, 
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, 
maps, or newspapers.”105  Before cell phones came around, people were 
not carrying every piece of personal information around with them.106  
Today, law enforcement can retrace a person’s life based on photos, texts, 
search, and location history contained in a phone.107  While current 
Supreme Court cases involve the use of cell phone searches and their privacy 
concerns, the same privacy concerns apply to computers because of their 
“immense storage capacity,” GPS capability, and Internet access.108   
Most people store bitcoins in electronic devices such as cell phones, 
computers, the cloud, or offline storage devices.  Because of the vast amount 
of information contained in these types of electronic devices, searching 
these devices for bitcoin information can be problematic.  Computers, cell 
phones, and digital storage devices include more than just a bitcoin digital 
wallet; they hold a significant amount of private information, implicating 
 
99. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). 
100. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
101. Id. at 387. 
102. Id. at 394. 
103. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221–23 (1973) (describing an instance where 
an officer pulled over a person for driving with a revoked license, arrested him, searched his pocket, 
and found a cigarette pack which contained capsules of heroin).  
104. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
105. Id.  
106. Id. at 395. 
107. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218, 2220 (2018) (explaining how the 
government can use historical cell-site location information to retrace a person’s every move).  
108. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94 (analogizing cell phones to minicomputers and discussing how 
the ability to store an immense amount of data in a single device brings forward privacy issues that 
searches of other physical items do not). 
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privacy concerns grounded in the Fourth Amendment.109  Because of these 
concerns, coupled with the ease of getting a warrant, a warrant is required 
in most cases before searching through a digital device’s contents. 
A valid search warrant must meet three requirements.  First, the issuing 
magistrate must be detached and neutral.110  Second, the warrant must be 
based on probable cause using a totality of the circumstances analysis with 
information provided to the magistrate judge by a government agent.111  
Third, the warrant must describe the property or place to be searched with 
particularity.112 
Establishing probable cause to search digital storage devices for bitcoin 
evidence is problematic.113  Considering how long it takes for government 
agents to decipher bitcoin information, it may be difficult for the agents to 
develop probable cause before someone transfers the bitcoins elsewhere.114  
When issuing a warrant, a “magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”115  Analytical tools 
allow government agents to find suspicious patterns within the Bitcoin 
blockchain.116  Although agents may see the transactions and the associated 
Bitcoin public addresses used in the exchange, discovering the identity of 
the owner is difficult because agents lack the IP address needed to trace the 
transaction back to the person or digital device.117  The Bitcoin system is 
designed to hide IP addresses from their corresponding transactions.118  
The challenge with establishing probable cause is that bitcoins may change 
hands instantaneously.119  Thus, by the time the government identifies a 
user, the bitcoin investigated may no longer belong to that user.  This makes 
it difficult for the government agent to prove probable cause.120 
 
109. Id. at 393. 
110. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
111. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
112. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
113. Lane, supra note 92, at 540–43. 
114. Id.  
115. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
116. Yakowicz, supra note 89. 
117. Bohannon, supra note 10.  
118. Id.  
119. Lane, supra note 92, at 542. 
120. Id. 
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Obtaining a warrant to search a cell phone, computer, or cloud storage 
may also prove to be somewhat challenging because of the particularity 
requirement.  The particularity requirement to obtain a warrant is a 
significant safeguard against unreasonable search and seizure; it prevents the 
government from having the ability to obtain a general warrant to search 
without limitation.121  The framers of the U.S. Constitution deliberately 
inserted the particularity safeguard in response to the abuse of warrants in 
England against the colonists, which allowed English officers to search at 
will.122  The prevention of general searches is not the only purpose of the 
particularity requirement.123  The particularity requirement also lets an 
individual know that an officer’s search is lawful, indicates what is being 
seized, and states the scope of the search.124  Warrants protect people’s 
right to privacy.   
A warrant must meet three requirements to adhere to the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  First, the warrant must list the 
specific offense the government agent believes they have probable cause 
for.125  Second, a warrant must describe “the place to be searched.”126  
Third, the warrant must describe “the persons or things to be seized.”127  
Because of the amount of information in electronic devices containing 
bitcoin wallets, it may be challenging to meet the particularity 
requirement.128  Digital device searches are significantly different from 
searches of other physical items.129  Unlike a search of physical evidence 
such as a purse or drawers, a search for information contained in an 
 
121. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–85 (1980) (“It is familiar history that 
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the 
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
122. Id. at 608 (White, J., dissenting). 
123. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004). 
124. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & 
Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)). 
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
126. Id.  
127. Id.  
128. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2017) (illustrating how the 
defendant deliberately hid files using labels such as “mbsobzvkhwx4hmjt” which makes it difficult for 
government agents to find using key words or cursorily reviews). 
129. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”). 
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electronic device usually requires an officer to take the entire device offsite 
to review the information inside.130   
Despite the concerns about warrants meeting the particularity 
requirement, courts continue to allow government agents to search 
electronic devices even when the warrant only describes the device, type of 
device, or place where the device may be found.131   The current case law 
on digital searches is “deferential to law enforcement.”132  The Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize the need for government agents to 
seize computers and take them offsite to search, as searching onsite is 
impracticable for law enforcement agents.133 
For example, in United States v. Ulbricht,134 the Second Circuit investigated 
the issue regarding whether the use of a warrant to search a laptop for 
evidence relating to the dark web website, Silk Road, and the resulting 
bitcoin wallet transactions met the particularity requirement.135  The 
defendant argued the warrant to search and seize his laptop “violated the 
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.”136  The Second Circuit 
acknowledged how a search of a computer hard drive provides government 
agents with a trove of sensitive information.137  The court went further to 
admit: “Where . . . the property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the 
particularity requirement assumes even greater importance.”138  Legal 
scholars and courts analogize computer hard drives to residences because 
of the amount of private information contained inside.139  Notwithstanding 
this acknowledgment, the Second Circuit held the search for bitcoin 
evidence in a laptop was lawful because a warrant does not need to describe 
 
130. James T. Stinsman, Comment, Computer Seizures and Searches: Rethinking the Applicability of the 
Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital 
Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015). 
131. Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 214–15 (2018). 
132. Kerr, supra note 130, at 6. 
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B); Kerr, supra note 130, at 6. 
134. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017).  
135. See id. (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement related to warrants 
to search technology). 
136. Id. at 99. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
139. See Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446 (“[A]dvances in technology and the centrality of computers in 
the lives of average people have rendered the computer hard drive akin to a residence in terms of the 
scope and quantity of private information it may contain.”). 
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the items searched perfectly.140  The court reasoned a broad warrant does 
not automatically mean the warrant lacks particularity.141   
The current case law seems to allow government agents to obtain broad 
warrants to search through digital devices, “so long as law enforcement 
agents have done the best that could reasonably be expected under the 
circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasonable 
investigation could be expected to cover, and have insured that all those 
facts were included in the warrant.”142  In light of Carpenter v. United 
States143 and Riley (which are not warrant cases), it seems that deference to 
government agents may diminish.144  Even in Ulbricht, the Second Circuit 
conceded that a different case than the one in front of them might require 
them to add limitations to digital searches to ensure warrants for digital 
searches meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.145 
Some courts are urging judges to examine search warrants of digital 
devices more carefully.146  In People v. Covlin,147 the New York Supreme 
Court found two warrants to search through digital devices lacked 
particularity.148  The New York Supreme Court found one warrant lacked 
particularity because it allowed law enforcement to search the defendant’s 
home for any type of electronic or paper record without limitation.149  The 
court found the other warrant lacked particularity because it granted the 
 
140. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446). 
143. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
144. See id. at 2218 (illustrating how cell phone technology has changed decades old case law 
relating to searches); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94 (2014) (describing how cell phones 
implicate greater privacy concerns than other physical searches).  Carpenter and Riley are not specifically 
about what is required when a warrant is obtained; however, their reasoning may lead courts to impose 
stricter requirements on officers seeking warrants. 
145. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 104. 
146. See People v. Covlin, 70 N.Y.S.3d 342, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (emphasizing the 
importance of courts affording proper deference to the process, so as not to defeat search warrants); 
Alyssa C. Goldrich, A Step in the Right Direction: Judge Suppresses Evidence Seized in Murder Case Due to 
Overbroad Computer Search Warrants, GDB LAW (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.gdblaw.com/ 
overboard-computer-search-warrants [https://perma.cc/BR6S-EGTG] (“[U]ntil the law can catch up 
to rapid technological innovations in society, search warrants seeking to access a defendants digital data 
must be scrutinized with the utmost diligence in order to effectively preserve one’s Constitutional right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
147. Covlin, 70 N.Y.S.3d at 347–49. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 347–48.  
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search of a cell phone for any stored electronic information.150  While this 
is a major win for advocates of protecting privacy, it is particularly 
worrisome for government agents who need access to a person’s digital and 
paper records to find bitcoin transactions.  Again, bitcoin keys can be stored 
digitally inside physical storage devices, the cloud, or on paper. 
Bitcoin storage wallets, like other digital evidence, differ substantially 
from other forms of physical evidence.151  While it is true that digital 
storage devices contain an immense amount of private information, it is also 
true that government agents will not always know where bitcoin information 
is stored.  Criminals may conceal bitcoin information within a large volume 
of other digital information, essentially making the bitcoin information a 
needle in a haystack.  Unfortunately, this means searching for evidence 
relating to bitcoin may inevitably lead to sorting through irrelevant private 
information.  Because a warrant allows the agent to search the entire wallet 
in its investigation of a single bitcoin, anything the government finds in that 
wallet could be fair game through the “plain view” doctrine.152  The plain 
view doctrine is an exception to the general rule requiring a warrant to search 
objects.153  The Supreme Court reasons “[i]f an article is already in plain 
view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of 
privacy.”154 
A recent case from a Michigan district court involving bitcoin helps 
illustrate this issue. In United States v. Stetkiw,155 Homeland Security 
Investigations was initially investigating Stetkiw for violations related to 
 
150. Id. at 348–49. 
151. See Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’ Revolt, 
68 EMORY L.J. 49, 57–58 (2018) (differentiating digital evidence from other forms of evidence because 
digital data is easier to conceal than other physical evidence, which can be hidden away in physical areas 
or containers). 
152. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135–37 (1990) (holding government agents may 
conduct a warrantless seizure as long as they are lawfully on the premises, discover evidence of a crime 
that is in plain view, and have probable cause to believe the property is evidence of a crime); Arizona 
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323–26 (1987) (explaining how the plain view doctrine was inapplicable when 
a police officer, while investigating a shooting inside an apartment, moved two stereos to see their 
serial numbers because he had a reasonable suspicion the stereos were stolen, but lacked the necessary 
probable cause); Yuval Simchi-Levi, Search Warrants in the Digital Age, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 995, 1005 
(2019) (discussing how the majority of circuit courts hold the plain view doctrine is applicable to 
electronic evidence as long the search for digital evidence is reasonably needed based on what is in the 
search warrant).  
153. Horton, 496 U.S. at 133. 
154. Id. (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325). 
155. United States v. Stetkiw, No. 18-20579, 2019 WL 2866516 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2019). 
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running an unlicensed bitcoin exchange service.156  The government had a 
warrant to search through Stetkiw’s computer data and image files.157  
While searching through the image files, the government agent found child 
pornography.158  After discovering the image, the agent immediately 
stopped the search and obtained another search warrant for child 
pornography and subsequently found more images.159   
Stetkiw’s attorneys then filed a motion to suppress the child pornography 
evidence found while searching the computer for bitcoin evidence.160  His 
lawyers argued the search warrant lacked particularity, and a search of 
computer images was unrelated to uncovering bitcoin evidence.161  The 
court held the warrant was particular because it identified all forms of 
storage, including images, and the agent who searched the computer 
justified the search of pictures because people may hide bitcoin information 
in various locations inside the computer.162  The government agent who 
searched the computer also testified he needed to look through the image 
files for bitcoin evidence because the image files may contain bitcoin QR 
codes, the information needed to recover a bitcoin wallet, and wallet 
passwords.163   
The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence because the agent 
had probable cause to search the computer image files for bitcoin evidence, 
and the child pornography photo was in plain view.164  Before concluding 
the opinion, the judge expressed concern about the agent’s testimony during 
the evidentiary hearing regarding the computer search.165  The agent stated, 
“[t]here were no practical limitations to what could be searched for on 
Stetkiw’s computer.”166  To the judge, this statement sounded like a general 
warrant.167  Nevertheless, while the judge ruled the search constitutional, 
they recommend that for the future, the magistrate judge issuing a warrant 
should conduct an ex ante review of the search procedures to assist courts 
 
156. Id. at *1. 
157. Id.  
158. Id.   
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Id. at *2. 
163. Id.  
164. Id. at *3–4. 
165. Id. at *4. 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
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and agents in conducting searches that do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.168   
The Stetkiw case demonstrated how a computer search allowed the 
government to discover evidence against “the bad guys.”  But what about 
the good guys?  While this is a win for the government agents combating 
crime and protecting society against people who illegally possess child 
pornography, this example is not illustrative of every potential circumstance.  
Would innocent people feel comfortable with a government agent searching 
through their private photos?  What if the images of child pornography did 
not belong to Stetkiw but someone else instead?  What if someone planted 
the images inside the computer through a virus?169  These questions are 
probably far-fetched ideas in Stetkiw’s case but could be a viable defense in 
other circumstances.  The level of anonymity bitcoin provides makes it 
difficult for agents to know where exactly bitcoin is stored and who it 
belongs to, which requires government agents to have some reasonable 
flexibility in conducting searches.  
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has issued three significant 
opinions relating to searches of digital storage devices.170  These cases 
demonstrate the Court is now seriously confronting the applicability of 
Fourth Amendment case law in a more technological society.  They also 
demonstrate how the Court is imposing significant limitations on searches 
and prioritizing the people’s right to privacy.  Considering this trend, it 
appears as though the Court or Congress may impose a stricter particularity 
requirement.  With this in mind, we must find other avenues in which 
government agents can obtain bitcoin evidence to combat crimes without 
violating a person’s right to privacy. 
 
168. Id. at *4–5. 
169. See generally Simchi-Levi, supra note 152, at 1002 (explaining how the Second Circuit held 
government agents may require a search of an entire electronic device to refute a defendant’s claim 
that a hacker placed files into a person’s computer thorough a hacking or virus). 
170. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (exemplifying how technology 
affects third-party doctrine caselaw); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding a warrant is 
needed to search data information on a cell phone seized from an arrestee because a cell phone is not 
a weapon and people have reasonable expectation that the information contained in their cell phones 
is private); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (ruling the government must obtain a 
warrant before installing a GPS device on someone’s vehicle because monitoring a vehicle’s every move 
is a search). 
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B. Bitcoin’s Public Ledger and a Person’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy  
Government agents may have better luck searching and analyzing 
Bitcoin’s blockchain because people do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy to information provided directly and indirectly on Bitcoin’s 
blockchain.  Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect 
information a person knowingly shares with the public.171  The Fourth 
Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches when a person has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy of the information or place searched.172  
Courts apply a two-part inquiry to determine whether an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable.173  Courts first assess whether a person subjectively 
believes that she has an expectation of privacy.174  Secondly, courts evaluate 
whether society would objectively recognize the expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.175  A person’s expectation of privacy must also be legitimate.176  
A legitimate expectation of privacy does not mean that a person had a 
subjective belief she would not be discovered.177   
The first step in determining whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is to assess whether a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy when he uses bitcoin, knowing the transaction is 
displayed permanently in Bitcoin’s blockchain.  There are several reasons 
why a person should not have a subjective expectation of privacy. 
Satoshi Nakamoto describes bitcoin as a “peer-to-peer version of 
electronic cash,” which allows people to send an electronic payment to other 
parties without having an intermediary such as a bank facilitating the 
process.178  To prevent people from double-spending bitcoin, miners use 
computers to solve mathematical problems that confirm the authenticity of 
the transactions and record the transactions onto a permanent record 
 
171. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
172. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018); Jones, 565 U.S. at 406; United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
173. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
174. Id.  
175. Id. 
176. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
177. See id. at 143 n.12 (“A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may 
have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes 
as ‘legitimate.’”). 
178. Nakamoto, supra note 17. 
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known as the blockchain or public ledger.179  As a reward for honest work, 
the system creates new bitcoin and issues bitcoins to the miners.180   
Everyone who has Internet access may search and see the bitcoin public 
ledger at any time.181  There is a record of every Bitcoin transaction on the 
Bitcoin blockchain.  The blockchain is named as such because each digital 
transaction is one of several transactions contained inside a “block.”182  
Miners then record each block on the “chain,” which is its shared public 
ledger.183  Each transaction tells viewers the time, date, amount spent, and 
address involved in the transaction.184  What the block might not tell you 
is the identity of the person who sent or received the bitcoin.185  Thus, 
people are under the misconception that bitcoin is entirely anonymous, 
keeping their transactions free from unauthorized intrusion.186  This 
perception is not accurate.  Bitcoin’s website acknowledges the 
misperception of it being an anonymous payment system.187  Bitcoin prides 
itself as being “the most transparent payment . . .  in the world.”188  Bitcoin 
is inherently not private because it is information a person knowingly shares 
with the public.189 
Satoshi Nakamoto discussed privacy in his bitcoin paper and explained 
how traditional banking systems could provide a certain level of privacy by 
limiting the amount of information provided to other parties.  Bitcoin, on 
the other hand, does not allow for this level of privacy because of the 
necessity to record all transactions on the blockchain to help people verify 
the authenticity of each bitcoin transaction.190  Nakamoto does address 
how a certain level of privacy can be achieved by “keeping public keys 
 
179. Id.  
180. Id.  
181. I—a person who does not own any bitcoin—did a quick google search for “Bitcoin 
Blockchain” and was directed to a website that shows me the bitcoin and ethereum, another form of 
cryptocurrency, blockchain.  Fortney, supra note 14.  
182. Id.  
183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. Bohannon, supra note 10. 
186. Id. (“‘It’s totally anonymous,’ was how one commenter put it in Bitcoin’s forums in 
June 2013.  ‘The FBI does not have a prayer of a chance of finding out who is who.’”). 
187. Protect Your Privacy, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy [https://per 
ma.cc/TG3T-DDDA]. 
188. Id.  
189. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).  
190. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 6. 
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anonymous.”191  Bitcoin’s website explicitly states that all of its transactions 
are “public, traceable, and permanently stored in the Bitcoin network.”192  
The website also acknowledges once someone uses a bitcoin, it is forever 
“tainted by the history of all transactions ever involved with.”193  Further, 
Bitcoin also recognizes how someone may trace a bitcoin address to a 
specific user and encourages users to take precautions in protecting their 
privacy.194   
These facts suggest there is no reasonable expectation of privacy because 
of the very idea the blockchain contains a public record of all bitcoin 
transactions that anyone with an Internet connection can access without 
accessing the individual’s computer.195  The core of Bitcoin’s infrastructure 
requires a permanent and public record so that others may verify the 
authenticity of the transactions.196  While a person’s real name might not 
appear on the blockchain, there are other methods in which others can link 
a person to a specific bitcoin.197  For example, if a person exchanges his 
bitcoin address in-person to a merchant who accepts bitcoins as a payment, 
the merchant now knows the individual’s real identity.198  
Moreover, people should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
since Bitcoin warns its users of the ability for someone “to listen for 
transactions’ relays and log their IP addresses.”199  Most federal circuit 
courts hold a person does not have a reasonable subjective expectation of 
privacy for IP address information.200  IP addresses may reveal a person’s 
 
191. Id.  
192. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.  
193. Id.  
194. Id. (“As the block chain is permanent, it’s important to note that something not traceable 
currently may become trivial to trace in the future.”). 
195. See Eric Wall, Privacy and Cryptocurrency, Part I: How Private is Bitcoin?, MEDIUM (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://medium.com/human-rights-foundation-hrf/privacy-and-cryptocurrency-part-i-how-private-
is-bitcoin-e3a4071f8fff [https://perma.cc/A3DU-P49P] (explaining Bitcoin is only semi-private).  
196. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining how the only way the system can prevent others 
from double-spending bitcoins is by requiring all Bitcoin transactions are publicly recorded). 
197. Wall, supra note 195. 
198. Id.  
199. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.  
200. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2017) (joining other circuit courts 
in holding a warrant is not required to for the government to collect IP addresses because a person 
does not have a “legitimate privacy interest” in IP address information); United States v. Wheelock, 
772 F.3d 825, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Wheelock cannot claim a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy in 
[the] government’s acquisition of his subscriber information, including his IP address and name from 
third-party service providers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Suing, 712 F.3d 1209, 
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location and Internet Service Provider (ISP), which in turn may reveal a 
person’s identity.201  There are even geolocation IP databases that allow 
you to determine a person’s approximate location using his IP address.202  
People may expose their identities even when connected to another person’s 
Wi-Fi network or a public Wi-Fi network because of the person’s browser 
history or stored cookies on a  personal computer.203   
Furthermore, even if a person believes he has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for information made public on the blockchain, it is not one society 
may accept or recognize as a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Bitcoin is a 
“decentralized peer-to-peer payment network that is powered by its 
users.”204  The very nature of Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network and structure 
requires that transactions are public,205 which leaves “extensive public 
records.”206  Regarding peer-to-peer networks, a person who makes a 
“decision to install and use file-sharing software [on his computer],” which 
opens “his computer to anyone else with the same freely available program,” 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.207  The same conclusion 
applies to a person’s expectation of privacy concerning bitcoin transactions 
because a person who knowingly and voluntarily uses bitcoin as a payment 
method cannot expect information that is recorded permanently on the 
blockchain, for others to see and verify, to be private.208  Bitcoin’s 
 
1213 (8th Cir. 2013))); United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding an 
expectation of privacy of IP address information is unreasonable (citing United States v. Perrine, 
518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(analogizing Internet users to telephone users, stating neither has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
because Internet users know their “IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party 
equipment” and are instead “voluntarily turned over” to ISPs to direct the communication). 
201. Wall, supra note 195. 
202. Id. (providing an example of a website which provides a rough approximate location of a 
user using an IP address); Inception, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en 
[https://perma.cc/HSC3-REMA] (stating how mapping a person’s location using an IP address is 
becoming increasingly precise).  
203. Wall, supra note 195 (providing an example of how a person’s Dropbox application will 
associate a person’s account with the IP address used whenever connected to the Internet as soon as 
the laptop is turned on). 
204. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.  
205. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.  
206. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5. 
207. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). 
208. See United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747–48 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding a person does 
not have an expectation of privacy when he “widely and voluntarily” disseminates information through 
the ordinary use of peer-to-peer software); Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127 (describing a case where a 
government agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he used LimeWire, a peer-to-peer 
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blockchain is not a peer-to-peer software where users share files, but it is a 
peer-to-peer network where other users confirm other user transactions. 
On the other hand, a person may argue he has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy of his identity because there is a difference between a permanent 
record of a bitcoin transaction and a record of his identity.  While a person 
may recognize his transactions are logged permanently on the blockchain 
public ledger, he may still maintain the subjective expectation that this 
identity or IP addresses would remain concealed because bitcoin 
information on the blockchain does not contain personally identifiable 
information.  Some users take extra precaution by utilizing tools to hide their 
identity or IP address.209  In Katz, the Supreme Court held the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information a person knowingly shares with 
the public.210  However, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”211  In Katz, 
the Court held that a defendant did not lose his Fourth Amendment 
protection merely because he used a public telephone booth.212  By closing 
the telephone booth door, the defendant expected his telephone 
conversation was private.213 
While many bitcoin users might not take steps in protecting their privacy, 
some sophisticated users deliberately try and protect their personal 
information.214  Like in Katz, if people take precautions in preventing 
exposure of their real-life identity by using tools that mask their IP 
addresses, people should not lose their expectation of privacy merely 
because their transaction is public.215  Bitcoin encourages users to protect 
their privacy by informing them only to use a specific bitcoin address once, 
not sharing their addresses, and using tools that make tracing IP addresses 
 
software, to access a defendant’s computer to find child pornography files because the defendant did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he used the software). 
209. United States v. Brown, 857 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing how Tor, a tool used 
to mask one’s IP address, “routes online communications through anonymizing proxy computers” to 
conceal the user’s true identity). 
210. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
211. Id.  
212. Id. at 152 (“One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays 
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”). 
213. Id.  
214. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (illustrating how Ulbricht used 
Tor, a tool used to make it difficult for people to trace Internet traffic). 
215. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was 
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”). 
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difficult.216  Under current case law, any attempt a person may make to 
conceal IP address information is possibly futile because a person cannot 
expect privacy when it comes to IP address information.217   
For example, bitcoin users use a popular tool to mask a person’s IP 
address: Tor.218  Tor is a free software used to block third-party trackers 
from accessing a person’s Internet cookies, guard against other people who 
try and monitor someone’s Internet usage, and provide Internet data traffic 
encryption.219  Despite using this tool, many courts hold there is still no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in protecting one’s IP address.220  In 
United States v. Matish,221 the court found a person’s subjective expectation 
of privacy is not objectively reasonable because Tor requires Internet users 
to provide their real IP address.222  By providing his IP address to a third 
party, the Tor user lost his expectation of privacy.223  For some courts, this 
finding is seemingly limited to the collection of IP addresses and does not 
allow government agents to access the contents of one’s computer without 
a warrant.224  Nevertheless, if the government can discover an IP address 
without searching unlawfully through a person’s computer, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Moreover, the government does not violate a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights when an agent uses computer software to perform a 
 
216. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.  
217. See Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 97–98 (holding collecting IP addresses is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, even when using tools such as Tor to conceal identities).  
218. David Hollerith, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous and Tor Users Are Forgetting This, BITCOIN MAG. 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-is-not-anonymous-and-tor-users-are-
forgetting-this [https://perma.cc/4G2Z-T6RP]; see also Andy Greenberg, The Grand Tor: How To Go 
Anonymous Online, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-grand-tor 
[https://perma.cc/67HP-HDXW] (indicating how millions of Internet users utilize Tor for the closest 
thing to anonymity on the Internet). 
219. Tor: Overview, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https:// 
perma.cc/BB2V-35FX]; Greenberg, supra note 218. 
220. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 615 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Even an Internet user 
who employs the Tor network in an attempt to mask his or her IP address lacks a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her IP address.”). 
221. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016). 
222. Id. at 616–17. 
223. Id.  
224. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2017) (limiting the holding to the 
collection of IP addresses and stating a warrant was not required because the government did not 
access the defendant’s communications). 
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forensic analysis of bitcoin’s blockchain.225  While one may analogize the 
government using computer software to analyze the blockchain to law 
enforcement officers handling a thermal imaging device from outside a 
person’s home to detect heat within the house, the reliance on that analogy 
is misplaced because both concepts are fundamentally different.226  In Kyllo 
v. United States,227 government agents suspected the defendant was growing 
marijuana inside his home.228  The agents scanned the exterior of the 
defendant’s home using a thermal imager to detect radiation consistent with 
the use of high-intensity lamps for growing marijuana indoors.229  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated: “[O]btaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home 
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”230 
The difference between the facts in Kyllo and the government’s use of 
computer software to analyze the blockchain is that in the former, the 
government is using technology not available to the general public to get a 
peek inside a person’s home, a constitutionally protected area.231  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized a person’s home is afforded the greatest 
Fourth Amendment protection because it is one’s “most private space.”232  
A home is an area that society as a whole would deem private because “[a]t 
the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”233  Nevertheless, 
 
225. See United States v. Norman, 448 F. App’x 895, 896 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by using a specialized 
software to view contents of a computer folder everyone in the peer-to-peer network had access to).  
See generally Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 98 (holding the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment by 
using pen registers to trap and trace IP addresses). 
226. See Norman, 448 F. App’x at 896 (distinguishing a home from information shared with 
others in a peer-to-peer network); Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 98 (contrasting software used to monitor a 
person’s “IP address traffic through his router” which is not protected by the Fourth Amendment to 
a thermal imager used from outside a person’s home, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
227. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
228. Id. at 29. 
229. Id. at 30.  
230. Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing people have a right against “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” inside their homes); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (acknowledging a person’s home is a 
constitutionally protected area).  
232. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 474–75 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
233. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 626–30 (1886)). 
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with regard to Bitcoin, the government is not using technology to take a 
glimpse into one’s most private space.  The government uses technology to 
analyze Bitcoin’s public ledger, which is not constitutionally protected 
because it is shared publicly on the Internet.234   
By recognizing that people do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for information available, directly and indirectly, through the Bitcoin 
blockchain and IP address information, the Bitcoin blockchain further 
enables government agents to crack down on crimes using cryptocurrencies 
such as bitcoin.  The government can trace blockchain and IP address 
information without accessing an individual’s computer, which lessens the 
likelihood of rummaging around in personal information.  The 
government’s ability to analyze data and track IP addresses gives it a better 
chance of obtaining information needed to establish probable cause to meet 
the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirements.  Changing this part 
of the caselaw may adversely affect government agents from effectively 
investigating crimes involving bitcoin, especially if the Legislature or courts 
decide to impose stricter warrant requirements. 
C. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to Bitcoin  
Currently, government agents may obtain bitcoin evidence through third 
parties.235  The Supreme Court established this third-party doctrine in 
United States v. Miller236 and Smith v. Maryland.237  In Miller, the Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau (ATF) requested financial records from 
banks holding the defendant’s financial accounts.238  The banks complied 
with the request.239  The defendant moved to suppress the bank records 
from being presented as evidence at trial.240  The Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect the bank records because they are part of the 
 
234. See United States v. Norman, 448 F. App’x 895, 897 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for information shared from the 
defendant’s computer because it was available through a peer-to-peer network); cf. United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (stating there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a voice 
recording because a “voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear”). 
235. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting there is a 
general consensus amongst federal courts indicating a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not 
violated when ISPs provide subscriber information to the government).  
236. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
237. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
238. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38. 
239. Id. at 438.  
240. Id.  
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bank’s commercial records.241  The documents were not Miller’s private 
papers.242  The Supreme Court stated: 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.  This Court 
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.243 
In Smith v. Maryland, a telephone company installed a pen register after 
police, without a warrant, requested it to do so after a robbery victim began 
receiving threatening phone calls from the alleged robber.244  The pen 
register successfully identified the caller, and the defendant moved to 
suppress any information obtained through the use of the pen register.245  
The Supreme Court held the use of the pen register did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a number dialed on the telephone.246  The Court 
reasoned there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for this information 
because all telephone users know the phone numbers dialed are provided to 
the phone companies to connect the calls.247  The Court also reasoned there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy because telephone users know 
phone companies maintain a record of the phone calls for billing 
purposes.248 
Under current caselaw, subpoenaing third parties to provide information 
on bitcoin users is possible.  Government agents may subpoena ISPs or 
bitcoin exchanges to provide certain disclosures.  There is an old rule that 
the government may compel others to disclose evidence they have within 
their possession.249  While the government does not need to meet the 
 
241. Id. at 444. 
242. Id. at 440–41. 
243. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745–52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).  
244. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
245. Id. at 735, 737. 
246. Id. at 742. 
247. Id. 
248. Id.  
249. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2228 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements to obtain a subpoena, a 
subpoena does not carry the same legal force as a warrant in allowing 
government agents to search and seize.250  Someone who receives a 
subpoena may object to the subpoena before complying, which adds a 
safeguard to assist in mitigating the intrusion.251 
In Part IV.B, I discussed how most circuit courts agree people do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for IP address information.  
Because of the third-party doctrine, government agents may obtain IP 
address information from ISPs.252  Similar to how people are associated 
with telephone numbers or mailing addresses, every device connected to the 
Internet is associated with a unique address known as an IP address.253  An 
IP address is similar to a telephone number because it provides the identity 
of the IP address’s owner; however, it does not reveal the actual contents of 
the communication.254  If, while investigating a crime involving bitcoin, a 
government successfully retrieves an IP address, the government may 
request IP information from the ISP without a warrant.255  This concept is 
true because the person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
for IP information, and a person knows this IP address information is 
shared with ISPs so they may “make communication among electronic 
devices possible.”256  Moreover, Internet users know they use third-party 
equipment to communicate over the Internet.257  While one may argue 
access to this information is an invasion of privacy because it allows for 
government surveillance, the Supreme Court has not overruled the third-
party doctrine as it relates to IP addresses.258 
Applying the third-party doctrine, the government may obtain bitcoin 
information by requesting information from bitcoin exchanges.  People can 
buy and sell bitcoins through specialized exchanges such as Bitstamp, 
 
250. See id. (explaining the difference between a warrant and a subpoena).  
251. Id. (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946)). 
252. See cases cited supra note 200. 
253. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2017). 
254. Id. at 84; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). 
255. See Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 97 (discussing the investigator’s ability to obtain IP information 
from an ISP without a warrant).   
256. Id.  
257. Id. at 96. 
258. Id. at 96–97 (declining to deviate from the third-party doctrine because, in this specific 
case, the government did not gain access to the actual contents of the computer by collecting IP address 
information). 
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Bitfinex, Coinbase, and several others.259  While specialized exchanges are 
not banks, they are financial services companies, also known as Money 
Services Businesses (MSBs), with money transmission licenses that require 
them to comply with federal laws applicable to financial institutions.260  
Exchanges are considered MSBs that are required to comply with federal 
regulations because they engage in money transmission services.  An MSB 
engages in money transmission services by accepting “currency, funds, or 
other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the 
transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency 
to another location or person by any means.”261 
While exchanges are subject to various federal and state money 
transmission regulations, some of “the most direct and effective regulations 
relatable to the use of Bitcoin in the criminal enterprise are the federal Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money laundering (AML) statutes.”262  The 
Bank Secrecy Act requires MSBs to verify customer identities, report 
specific transactions, and retain records for up to five years.263  The USA 
Patriot Act goes further to require MSBs to keep exhausted records and 
maintain information regarding their customers’ identities.264  The purpose 
of this record keeping is to ensure banks have a system in place to assist law 
enforcement in deterring and detecting crimes through the misuse of 
financial institutions.265 
The reasoning in Miller is applicable when dealing with specialized 
exchanges because Miller dealt with records that belonged to banks.266  
Exchanges are not banks in the usual sense, but they are required to maintain 
records just like banks.  As such, people who go through specialized 
exchanges voluntarily provide their information to exchanges, and the 
 
259. See Prableen Bajpai, A Look at the Most Popular Bitcoin Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 16, 
2019) https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/111914/look-most-popular-bitcoin-exchan 
ges.asp [https://perma.cc/KSQ9-FQZN] (describing various bitcoin exchanges). 
260. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, COINBASE, https://support. 
coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2689172-coinbase-regulatory-compliance [https://perma 
.cc/8KYP-9RF2] (listing statutes money services businesses must comply with). 
261. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2014). 
262. Lane, supra note 92, at 535 (footnotes omitted). 
263. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, supra note 260. 
264. Lane, supra note 92, at 536–37 (explaining the requirements of the USA Patriot Act). 
265. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/index-bsa.html [https://perma. 
cc/589D-UBRT]. 
266. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976) (concluding defendant did not 
have a Fourth Amendment interest to dispute the subpoena of his bank records).  
30
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 1, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss1/5
  
2020] COMMENT 183 
government does not violate their Fourth Amendment right just because it 
obtains information from the exchanges.  For example, Coinbase discloses 
to its customers that they must comply with various regulations, which 
include verifying their identities and keeping records of it.267 
V.    WHY THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE CONTINUES 
TO APPLY TO BITCOIN 
The Supreme Court decided both Miller and Smith in the 1970s.  To say 
times have changed would be an understatement.  Since the third-party 
doctrine’s inception, the Court has consistently held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect information shared with third parties.268  The 
2018 landmark Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States finally put a 
restriction on the doctrine.269  The Court held officers needed a search to 
obtain historical cell phone location records from cell phone companies.270  
The Court reasoned that cell phones pose a genuine privacy concern 
because this would allow the government to track everyone’s movement.271  
The Court was also careful in stating this was a narrow ruling and did not 
change the third-party doctrine as it applied to most areas such as bank 
records.272  There has been some discussion about reconsidering the third-
party doctrine altogether.  Justice Sotomayor has expressed that the third-
party doctrine is unsuitable in this digital age because of the amount of 
information people share with third parties during the ordinary course of 
someone’s day.273 
Since Carpenter, many defendants have moved to suppress evidence 
obtained through third parties such as ISPs or bitcoin exchanges.274  In 
Carpenter, the Supreme Court’s principal concern was with the government’s 
seemingly limitless ability to track a person’s every movement through 
historical cell site location information.275  The Court was also concerned 
 
267. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, supra note 260. 
268. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17, 2220 (2018) (declining to apply 
the third-party doctrine). 
269. See id. at 2220 (declining to apply Smith and Miller and thereby restricting the third-party 
doctrine). 
270. Id. at 2221. 
271. Id. at 2217–18. 
272. Id. at 2220. 
273. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
274. See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to apply 
Carpenter’s holding to IP address information). 
275. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.  
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with the government’s ability to “travel back in time” and track a person’s 
life for the past five years.276  Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) raises 
technology concerns that bitcoin does not.  Cell phones are almost like an 
appendage to the human body.277  People carry their phones with them 
everywhere they go.278  The government’s access to this information 
provides more than just their location; this access “provides an intimate 
window into a person’s life.”279 
There are several reasons why IP address information is fundamentally 
different from CSLI.  CSLI allows the government to treat cell phones like 
GPS monitoring devices and enables the government to see a person’s every 
move for up to five years, depending on the cell phone carrier’s retention 
schedule.280  Second, cell phones ping location information to the nearest 
cell phone tower without any voluntary action from the cell phone user.281  
In contrast, an IP address is generated when a person makes the “affirmative 
decision to access a website or application.”282  Third, while someone can 
find a person’s location using an IP address, an additional process is needed 
to find the location.  When the government acquires the IP address, that 
address does not contain the location, just numbers.283  CSLI reveals, 
“without an independent investigation,” the cell phone user’s location.284  
So long as IP addresses do not enable the government to track a person’s 
every move, Carpenter should not apply.285  Again, the Supreme Court was 
concerned with total surveillance.286  An IP address is like a phone number 
or address.  If the IP address information is used to only find the identity of 
 
276. Id. at 2218.  
277. Id.  
278. See id. (analogizing a cell phone to an ankle monitor).  
279. Id. at 2217.  
280. See id. at 2217–18 (explaining the CSLI allows the government to trace a person’s 
whereabouts and cellphones are comparable to GPS devices); see also United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 
87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Carpenter and holding that the CSLI and telephones essentially comprise a 
GPS system that the government has access to).  
281. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including 
incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically 
makes . . . .”).  
282. Hood, 920 F.3d at 92. 
283. Id.  
284. Id.  
285. See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to 
extend Carpenter to IP address information because the defendant failed to prove IP address 
information enabled the government to track his daily movements). 
286. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (expressing the concern of “near perfect” surveillance). 
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individuals and does not allow the government to retrieve the actual 
contents of the communication, then a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for IP address information.    
Regarding bitcoin exchanges, fortunately, Carpenter did not affect Miller’s 
holding.  In Carpenter, the Supreme Court explicitly stated its decision does 
not disrupt Miller.287  The Court deliberately chose not to address “business 
records that might incidentally reveal location information.”288  While 
bitcoin exchanges are not financial institutions in the usual sense, the 
government does not treat them differently from other financial institutions 
by imposing federal laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act.   
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Despite living in a digital world, the third-party doctrine should be 
preserved and only limited on a case-by-case basis.  The third-party doctrine 
allows the government to keep up with criminals.  Without this legal 
principle, the government would need to rely on the Legislature to enact 
laws that assist them in finding criminals.  It is imperative to recognize the 
Supreme Court was deliberate in limiting their holding to CSLI.  
Furthermore, with CSLI, the government knows the identity of the 
person it wants the CSLI from.  It makes sense to require a warrant to obtain 
historical location information because the government should demonstrate 
they have probable cause in believing a crime was committed or is in the 
process of being committed.  On the other hand, concerning bitcoin, 
without the third-party doctrine, the government’s ability to find a criminal 
is severely hindered because the government relies on IP information to 
discover a criminal’s identity.  Sophisticated criminals find ways to hide their 
identities, and statutes or caselaw should not restrict the government from 
using IP address information to assist it in finding them.  IP address 
information allows government agents to find suspects and get the probable 
cause needed to obtain a warrant.  If the Legislature or courts impose stricter 
warrant requirements in the future, the government’s need for IP address 
information is even greater.  If the information is limited to discovering the 
person’s identity behind the IP address, there should not be a strong privacy 
concern. 
While I am concerned IP address information may one day reveal 
extensive location data similar to CSLI, I also believe we must remember 
 
287. Id. at 2220.  
288. Id. at 2210. 
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what is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, protection against unreasonable 
searches.289  Concerning bitcoin, when determining whether the 
government violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment right, courts 
should assess the government’s reasonableness by weighing the 
government’s great interest with the defendant’s lessened (or nonexistent) 
privacy interests.290  Considering how criminals are using digital currencies 
to fund crimes and how difficult it is to find a criminal’s identity when using 




289. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 
(1960)). 
290. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461 (2013) (“The reasonableness of any search 
much be considered in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy.”) (emphasis added). 
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